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_______________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, 
This case is on appeal to us for the second time.  It 
arises from a loan transaction between Appellant Nuveen 
Municipal Trust (“Nuveen”), on behalf of its “Nuveen High 
Yield Municipal Bond Fund,” and Bayonne Medical Center 
(“Bayonne”).  In connection with the transaction, Bayonne 
provided Nuveen with an audit report authored by Bayonne’s 
accounting firm, Appellee WithumSmith+Brown, P.C. 
(“Withum”), and an opinion letter authored by Bayonne’s 
counsel, Appellee Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & 
Cooper P.C. (“Lindabury”).  Soon after the transaction, 
Bayonne filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.  Nuveen contends 
that the audit report and opinion letter concealed problem 
aspects of Bayonne’s financial condition, and had it known 
about these financial issues, it would not have entered into the 
transaction.   
Circuit Judge 
Nuveen filed this action against Withum and 
Lindabury, asserting fraud (as to Withum only), negligent 
misrepresentation, and malpractice (as to Lindabury only), 
and representing that the District Court had diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The Court dismissed the 
action with prejudice based on Nuveen’s noncompliance with 
New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 2A:53A-26 et seq. (the “AOM Statute” or “Statute”), 
which requires the timely filing of an affidavit of merit 
attesting to the viability of claims in certain actions against 
professionals.   
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On initial appeal to us, Nuveen brought to our 
attention Emerald Investors Trust v. Gaunt Parsippany 
Partners, 492 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2007), which held that, for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of a trust is 
determined by the citizenship of its beneficial shareholders.  
Because Nuveen may be considered a trust, Emerald called 
into question the District Court’s previously asserted basis for 
jurisdiction.  We granted Nuveen’s unopposed motion to 
remand the case to allow the District Court to reconsider its 
jurisdiction. 
On remand, Withum and Lindabury raised a new basis 
for jurisdiction—that the action was “related to” Bayonne’s 
bankruptcy proceeding, and thus that the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).  The Court accepted 
this basis for jurisdiction and re-entered its order dismissing 
the action with prejudice.  Both the jurisdictional decision and 
its dismissal of the action are on appeal to us now.  Nuveen 
also raises two new choice-of-law arguments on appeal: that 
the AOM Statute is a procedural pleading requirement that 
conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 such that the 
Statute cannot be applied in federal court, as federal 
procedural rules preempt conflicting state ones; or that certain 
provisions to protect plaintiffs with respect to the Statute are 
substantive state law that must be applied by a federal court 
under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its 
progeny.   
We agree that the District Court had “related to” 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).  We further hold that 
the AOM Statute can be applied by a federal court without 
conflicting with Rule 8, and that the protections Nuveen 
identifies are procedural under Erie, thus not requiring a 
federal court to follow them.  If the AOM Statute applies to 
the action, we believe that Nuveen’s noncompliance with it 
calls for the action’s dismissal, but question whether this 
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action is subject to the Statute.  Because the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has not addressed key issues regarding the 
application of the Statute, we reserve deciding whether the 
District Court was correct to dismiss the action with prejudice 
and certify two questions of law regarding the Statute to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court.  
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
In the attempt to salvage its action from dismissal 
purely based on its counsel not filing timely affidavits of 
merits, Nuveen’s arguments fall into four broad categories: 
(i) jurisdiction; (ii) the AOM Statute’s application in federal 
court under Erie and its progeny; (iii) the Statute’s application 
to its action as a legal matter; and (iv) whether its 
noncompliance with the Statute can be excused.  To decide 
these issues, we detail the history of the loan transaction, 
Bayonne’s bankruptcy proceeding, this action, the Statute, 
and the proceedings in and decisions of the District Court. 
A.  Loan Transaction and Bayonne’s Bankruptcy
 In October 2006, Nuveen, on behalf of one of its bond 
funds, purchased a $10 million Bond Anticipation Note 
(“BAN”) from Bayonne.  In connection with the transaction, 
Bayonne provided Nuveen with an audit report prepared by 
Withum regarding Bayonne’s company-prepared 2005 
financial statements.  As Bayonne’s counsel in the 
transaction, Lindabury provided Nuveen with an opinion 
letter addressing Bayonne’s ability to repay the BAN.  It 
included the typical opinion that Bayonne had the power and 
authority to enter into the BAN transaction and that, other 
than one disclosed investigation not relevant here, there were 
no investigations or suits that “could reasonably be expected 
to . . . materially [and] adversely affect the capability of 
[Bayonne] to comply with its obligations under [the BAN], or 
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materially [and] adversely affect the transactions 
contemplated to be consummated on the part of [Bayonne] as 
described in the [BAN].”     
 Six months later, in April 2007, Bayonne filed its 
Chapter 11 petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
New Jersey.  In October 2007, the Bank of New York, master 
trustee, filed a proof of claim on behalf of Nuveen and other 
secured creditors totaling $46,673,886.79.  Nuveen’s portion 
of the claim was for $10,533,989.84 (including approximately 
$10,000,000 principal on the BAN, $436,136.98 in interest, 
and $97,852.86 for Nuveen’s fees and expenses).  
 As a prelude to this action, in May 2008 Nuveen 
requested that Bayonne provide it with documents to 
determine whether it had a cause of action against Bayonne’s 
officers, directors, and “pre-petition professionals” for 
misrepresentations or other conduct that induced Nuveen to 
purchase the BAN.  Bayonne did not respond, and Nuveen 
served a subpoena on it and then filed a motion to compel.  
Notably, in the materials accompanying its motion to compel, 
Nuveen represented that any amounts it recovered from such 
actions would reduce its claim against Bayonne’s bankruptcy 
estate.  It also specifically identified potential suits against 
Withum and Lindabury. 
 No doubt partially in response to Nuveen’s (and 
possibly other creditors’) requests for documents, Bayonne 
made a global settlement agreement among it, the Official 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and certain secured 
creditors that included Nuveen (the “Settlement Agreement”).  
Approved by the Bankruptcy Court in September 2008, the 
Settlement Agreement provided that it would be implemented 
by a plan of liquidation.  In the event the confirmed plan did 
not conform to the Settlement Agreement, or Bayonne’s 
bankruptcy case was converted or dismissed, the Agreement 
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would control and survive.1
 The Settlement Agreement granted the secured 
creditors a general unsecured claim in the amount of 
$46,673,886.79 (the dollar amount asserted in the master 
trustee’s proof of claim), which would be reduced “dollar for 
dollar” for sums received by the secured creditors through 
certain distributions defined in the Agreement.  Thus it 
effectively fixed Nuveen’s claim against Bayonne’s estate as 
a secured claim in an amount to be determined based on funds 
in Bayonne’s estate and an unsecured claim to be paid pro 
rata with other unsecured claims.          
  It further provided that the 
secured creditors would not pursue claims against any of 
Bayonne’s former officers, directors or trustees, but preserved 
the secured creditors’ right to bring claims against any third 
parties (i.e., Withum and Lindabury) retained by, or who had 
rendered services to, Bayonne. 
B.  
 In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, Nuveen 
filed this action against Withum and Lindabury in December 
2008.  As to Withum, Nuveen asserted that Bayonne’s 2005 
financial statements were false and misleading because they 
recorded substantial revenue from a sham charitable pledge 
and showed as assets a substantial amount of uncollectible 
accounts receivable.  Nuveen contended that if Withum had 
examined the financial statements consistent with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles and specific accounting 
standards promulgated by the American Institute for Certified 
District Court Complaint 
                                              
1 The Bankruptcy Court approved Bayonne’s plan of 
liquidation (the “Plan”) in April 2009, approximately four 
months after Nuveen filed this action.  The Plan incorporates 
the Settlement Agreement in full.   
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Public Accountants, it would not have issued its audit report 
because, once the sham revenue and uncollectible receivables 
were considered, it would have known that Bayonne either 
was insolvent or soon would become insolvent.  Based on 
these allegations, Nuveen asserted three claims against 
Withum: (i) common law fraud; (ii) aiding and abetting 
common law fraud; and (iii) negligent misrepresentation.  
 As to Lindabury, Nuveen asserted that Lindabury’s 
opinion letter was misleading because it failed to disclose a 
certain repayment obligation Bayonne owed under Medicare.  
Based on this allegation, Nuveen asserted against Lindabury 
(i) negligent misrepresentation and (ii) malpractice in 
preparing the opinion.2
 Nuveen sought compensatory damages, prejudgment 
interest, costs, punitive damages, and other relief.  It stated 
that its compensatory damages were then unknown, but 
believed them to be $9.5 million less any amounts recovered 
in Bayonne’s bankruptcy proceeding plus attorney’s fees 
incurred in the bankruptcy proceeding.  
 
                                              
2 The opinion letter stated that Lindabury relied on certificates 
of Bayonne’s officers that it assumed were true and correct in 
all respects, and that it undertook no independent 
investigation to determine the existence or absence of any 
factual matters.  The certificates, dated the loan closing date, 
were from Robert H. Evans, Bayonne’s President and Chief 
Executive Officer, and Paul Mohrle, Bayonne’s Acting Chief 
Financial Officer.  As such, absent fraud (and there are no 
allegations to that effect as to Lindabury or to its pre-closing 
knowledge contrary to its opinion), there is doubt that Nuveen 
has viable causes of action against Lindabury based on the 
opinion letter.     
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 In preparing its complaint, Nuveen communicated with 
two experts.  First, in April 2008 it discussed Withum’s audit 
report with Gordon Yale, a Certified Public Accountant.  
Based on his affidavit later filed with the District Court, Yale 
concluded that there was a “reasonable probability” that 
Withum’s work that is the subject of the complaint fell 
outside of applicable professional standards.  The affidavit 
also verifies that in April 2008 Yale submitted to Nuveen’s 
counsel a 16-page report addressing the matters alleged 
against Withum in the complaint.   
 Second, in November 2008 Nuveen called Robert 
Doty, a bond and securities lawyer.  Nuveen’s counsel 
described the allegations against Lindabury in the complaint 
to Doty during a phone conversation.  Based on that 
information, as verified in his affidavit subsequently 
submitted to the District Court, Doty stated that he believed 
there was a “reasonable probability” Lindabury’s opinion fell 
outside applicable professional standards.  
C.  
 The New Jersey legislature enacted the AOM Statute 
“as part of a tort reform package ‘designed to strike a fair 
balance between preserving a person’s right to sue and 
controlling nuisance suits.’”  Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. 
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 579 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Palanque 
v. Lambert-Woolley, 774 A.2d 501, 505 (N.J. 2001)).  It 
requires that a plaintiff filing “any action for damages for 
personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage 
resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by 
a licensed professional” provide each defendant with “an 
affidavit of an appropriate licensed person [stating] that there 
exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or 
knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or 
work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside 
AOM Statute 
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acceptable professional or occupational standards or 
treatment practices.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27.  This 
affidavit must be provided within 60 days after the defendant 
files its answer.  Id.  For good cause shown, the Statute 
provides for one extension period of an additional 60 days 
contiguous to the initial 60-day period.  Id. 
The penalty for not following the AOM Statute is 
severe.  Absent a showing of one of four limited exceptions,3
Aware of this harsh consequence, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court instituted two safeguards to aid plaintiffs in 
complying with the AOM Statute.  First, it directed that New 
Jersey’s Civil Case Information Sheet be amended to contain 
the question, “IS THIS A PROFESSIONAL 
MALPRACTICE CASE?,” and boxes to check “YES” or 
 
the failure to file the affidavit “shall be deemed a failure to 
state a cause of action.”  Id. § 2A:53A-29.  Thus, unless the 
plaintiff can show one of the four exceptions, if an affidavit 
of merit is not filed within the 60- or extended 120-day 
period, the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.  
                                              
3 They are: (i) a statutory exception regarding lack of 
information; (ii) a “common knowledge” exception; (iii) 
substantial compliance with the affidavit of merit 
requirement; or (iv) “extraordinary circumstances” that 
warrant equitable relief.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-28 
(detailing the statutory exception); Ferreira v. Rancocas 
Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779, 782–83 (N.J. 2003) 
(detailing the “extraordinary circumstances” exception); 
Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495, 501 (N.J. 2001) (establishing 
the “common knowledge” exception); Cornblatt v. Barow, 
708 A.2d 401, 411–12 (N.J. 1996) (establishing that the 
substantial compliance doctrine applies to the affidavit 
requirement).   
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“NO.”  Underneath the question is the following sentence:  
“IF YOU HAVE CHECKED ‘YES,’ SEE N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-
27 AND APPLICABLE CASE LAW REGARDING YOUR 
OBLIGATION TO FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT.”  See 
Burns v. Belafsky, 766 A.2d 1095, 1101 (N.J. 1999).    
Second, the New Jersey Supreme Court required that 
an accelerated case management conference be held within 90 
days of the service of the answer in all malpractice actions.  
See Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779, 
785 (N.J. 2003).  At this conference, if the plaintiff has not 
filed an affidavit, the trial court is to remind it of the 
requirement.  Id. 
D.  
 Along with its complaint, Nuveen filed the standard 
Civil Cover Sheet used in the federal court.  Unlike New 
Jersey’s Civil Case Information Sheet, the Civil Cover Sheet 
here did not contain the question, box, or any notice regarding 
the AOM Statute. 
Proceedings in the District Court 
 In January 2009, Withum and Lindabury filed answers 
to the complaint.  (Their answers contained third-party 
complaints against Bayonne’s officers, which they later 
consented to the dismissal of without prejudice.)  On June 4, 
2009, 142 days after they filed their answers, Withum and 
Lindabury filed separate motions to dismiss with prejudice 
the actions against them based on Nuveen’s failure to serve a 
timely affidavit of merit.4
                                              
4 Specifically, Lindabury’s motion was styled as a motion for 
summary judgment, though it acknowledged that the motion 
was functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss.  Withum’s 
motion was a motion to dismiss.  The District Court regarded 
  Nuveen provided the two expert 
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affidavits discussed above the day after the motions to 
dismiss were filed.   
 Between the filings of the answers and the motions to 
dismiss, Withum, Lindabury, and Nuveen formally 
conferenced twice.  In April 2009, they held a telephone 
conference under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f).  
Nuveen’s counsel subsequently circulated a draft report on 
the Rule 26(f) conference.  In May 2009, Magistrate Judge 
Douglas E. Arpert held a scheduling conference.  At no time 
did Withum or Lindabury mention the AOM Statute.  
Contrary to the practice of New Jersey state courts, the 
District Court did not hold a status conference within 90 days 
of the filing of the answers nor remind Nuveen of the 
affidavit requirement.   
Nuveen also filed a response to the motions to dismiss 
in which it raised four arguments that its action should be 
allowed to proceed.  First, it asserted that the AOM Statute 
did not apply to any of its claims because they were for 
economic damages, which are not “property damages” 
subject to the Statute.  Alternatively, it contended that the 
Statute did not apply to its non-negligence and non-
malpractice claims—specifically its fraud claims against 
Withum.  Third, assuming the Statute applied, Nuveen argued 
that its noncompliance should be excused because it 
substantially complied with the Statute.  Alternatively, and 
finally, it argued that extraordinary circumstances required 
dismissal of the action without prejudice.  Nuveen also stated 
that it sought to recover the amount it had paid for the BAN, 
plus related costs and interest, less any amounts it recovered 
prior to the end of the action, including any disbursements 
from Bayonne’s bankruptcy estate.    
                                                                                                     
them both as motions to dismiss, and proceeded to analyze 
them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
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E.  
 The District Court rejected each of Nuveen’s 
arguments regarding the AOM Statute.  In holding that the 
monetary recovery sought by Nuveen was subject to the 
Statute, it cited two New Jersey intermediate state court 
decisions—Cornblatt v. Barow, 696 A.2d 65, 68 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 708 A.2d 401 
(N.J. 1998), and Nagim v. New Jersey Transit, 848 A.2d 61, 
70 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003)—for their statements that 
a claim against an attorney for alleged malpractice is a claim 
for “property damages” and that these damages include 
claims for monetary damages.   
District Court Decisions 
In considering the fraud claims against Withum, the 
District Court cited Couri v. Gardner, 801 A.2d 1134, 1141 
(N.J. 2002), for its statement that the nature of the legal 
inquiry should guide the assessment of whether the Statute 
applies to a claim.  Because the complaint contained 
numerous references to accounting standards, the Court 
concluded that the Statute applied to all of the causes of 
action against Withum.  Finally, it noted that Nuveen’s failure 
to file an affidavit of merit was caused solely by attorney 
inadvertence, which was not a reasonable explanation to 
excuse Nuveen’s noncompliance with the Statute or to find 
the existence of extraordinary circumstances.  
 On remand regarding jurisdiction, the District Court 
agreed with Withum’s and Lindabury’s argument that the 
action was related to Bayonne’s bankruptcy proceeding 
because its outcome conceivably could affect the distribution 
of the estate’s assets.  It noted that though the Settlement 
Agreement fixed Nuveen’s claim in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, it did not fix its recovery.  Because Nuveen 
simultaneously was seeking the same damages—unpaid 
principal and interest on the BAN—from Bayonne’s estate as 
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well as Withum and Lindabury, if Nuveen recovered from 
Withum and Lindabury first, its claim against Bayonne’s 
estate would need to be reduced, thereby increasing the 
amount of assets available for distribution to other creditors.  
(In short, Nuveen could not recover twice for the same loss.)  
The District Court thus held that it had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(b).         
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
Whether the District Court had jurisdiction is an issue 
on appeal.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over 
its final decisions that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(b), and to dismiss this action.   
Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question 
of law requiring de novo review.  W.R. Grace & Co. v. 
Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.), 591 F.3d 164, 170 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2009).  Our review of a motion to dismiss is plenary.  
Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 579 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  We “accept as true all well-pled factual 
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from them, and we affirm the order of dismissal 
only if the pleading does not plausibly suggest an entitlement 
to relief.”  Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 
237, 242 (3d Cir. 2008).  Similarly, we review de novo the 
District Court’s determinations regarding New Jersey state 
law.  Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 271, 273 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
III.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
A.  
 Nuveen argues that the District Court inappropriately 
relieved Withum and Lindabury of their burden of proving 
Burden of Proof 
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that the Court had jurisdiction.  As such, because Nuveen’s 
arguments cast doubt on jurisdiction, the Court should have 
construed this doubt in favor of Nuveen and held that it 
lacked jurisdiction.   
Nuveen is correct that the party asserting a federal 
court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that 
jurisdiction exists.  See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 
1181, 1194 (2010) (“The burden of persuasion for 
establishing diversity jurisdiction, of course, remains on the 
party asserting it.”).  Federal courts are presumed not to have 
jurisdiction without affirmative evidence of this fact.  See 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 
(2006).  However, a district court “is free to weigh the 
evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to 
hear the case.”  Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).  Indeed, a district court has 
an independent obligation to determine whether subject 
matter jurisdiction exists, even if its jurisdiction is not 
challenged.  See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 
(2006). 
 Though the District Court did not state explicitly that 
Withum and Lindabury bore the burden of establishing 
jurisdiction, its decision confirms that it required them to 
prove jurisdiction and that it considered the evidence 
presented regarding jurisdiction.  For example, the Court 
stated that it was “persuaded” that, at the time Nuveen filed 
the complaint in December 2008, it was conceivable that the 
outcome of this action would have an effect on Bayonne’s 
bankruptcy proceeding.  Thus, it proceeded correctly in 
considering its jurisdiction.    
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B.  
1.  
Subject Matter Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)   
Section 1334(b) provides that “district courts . . . have 
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings 
arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under 
title 11.”  28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (emphasis added).  In Pacor, 
Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984), overruled in 
part by Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 
134–35 (1995), we established that a proceeding is “related 
to” a Chapter 11 proceeding if the “outcome of [the] 
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate 
being administered in bankruptcy.”  Id. at 994 (emphasis 
added).   
Principles of “Related To” Jurisdiction 
The key inquiry no doubt is conceivability.  
“Certainty, or even likelihood [of effect on the estate being 
administered in bankruptcy,] is not a requirement.”  Copelin 
v. Spirco, Inc., 182 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Halper v. Halper, 164 F.3d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1999)) 
(alteration in original).  An action thus generally is “related 
to” a bankruptcy proceeding “if the outcome could alter the 
debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action 
(either positively or negatively) and which in any way 
impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt 
estate.”  Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994.     
The Supreme Court endorsed Pacor’s conceivability 
standard with the caveats that “related to” jurisdiction “cannot 
be limitless,” and that the critical component of the Pacor test 
is that “bankruptcy courts have no jurisdiction over 
proceedings that have no effect on the estate of the debtor.”  
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 & n.6 (1995).  
In addition, “related to” jurisdiction does not exist if another 
action would need to be filed before the current action could 
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affect a bankruptcy proceeding.  See W.R. Grace, 591 F.3d at 
172; In re Fed.-Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 382 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
Conceivability is determined at the time a lawsuit is 
filed.  See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 
U.S. 567, 570–71 (2004) (“It has long been the case that ‘the 
jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at 
the time of the action brought.’” (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824))).  Although we once 
declined to apply the time of filing rule in a federal question 
case, New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity 
Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492 (3d Cir. 1996), 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the 
continuing vitality of the rule.  See Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. 
at 582 (“We decline to endorse a new exception to a time-of-
filing rule that has a pedigree of almost two centuries.  
Uncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction is 
particularly undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point 
particularly wasteful.”); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 
U.S. 468, 478 (2003) (“[J]urisdiction of the Court depends 
upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.” 
(quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 
(1993))).  Indeed, the strength and longevity of this rule has 
led courts to hold that confirmation of a bankruptcy plan does 
not divest a district court of related-to jurisdiction over pre-
confirmation claims.  See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re 
Enron Corp. Sec.), 535 F.3d 325, 336 (5th Cir. 2008); 
ConocoPhillips Co. v. SemGroup, L.P. (In re SemCrude, 
L.P.), 428 B.R. 82, 96–98 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).                
 There is one twist to the otherwise straightforward 
application of Pacor’s conceivability standard.  If an action is 
brought after the confirmation of a plan in a related 
bankruptcy proceeding, the post-confirmation context of the 
dispute alters the “related to” inquiry.  Because a bankruptcy 
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court’s jurisdiction wanes after the confirmation of a case, 
“retention of bankruptcy jurisdiction may be problematic. . . .  
At the most literal level, it is impossible for the bankrupt 
debtor’s estate to be affected by a post-confirmation dispute 
because the debtor’s estate ceases to exist once confirmation 
has occurred.”  Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP (In re 
Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 372 F.3d 154, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Nonetheless, “courts do not usually apply Pacor’s ‘effect on 
the bankruptcy estate’ test so literally as to entirely bar post-
confirmation bankruptcy jurisdiction.”  Id. at 165.  Instead, 
they apply varying standards that focus on whether the action 
could conceivably affect the implementation of the confirmed 
plan.  See id. at 166; U.S. Tr. v. Gryphon at the Stone 
Mansion, Inc., 166 F.3d 552, 556 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying 
Pacor to hold that a post-confirmation action for fees was 
related to the bankruptcy proceeding “because it directly 
relates to the debtor’s liabilities—in fact it creates a 
liability—and could impact the handling and administration 
of the estate”).       
2.  
 Nuveen’s primary argument is that its recovery from 
Bayonne’s estate was fixed by the Settlement Agreement, 
which was approved by the Bankruptcy Court prior to its 
filing of the action.  Under Nuveen’s theory, if it recovers 
from Withum and Lindabury in this action, its claim against 
Bayonne’s estate can be assigned to them.  Bayonne’s estate 
thus would not be affected.  Likewise, if Nuveen recovers 
from the estate first, that recovery would offset its recovery in 
this action, decreasing Nuveen’s recovery from Withum and 
Lindabury and not affecting Bayonne’s estate.   
Application to Nuveen’s Action 
Nuveen dusts off the rarely cited Ivanhoe Bldg. & 
Loan Assn. v. Orr, 295 U.S. 243 (1935), which was decided 
under the Bankruptcy Act (the immediate predecessor to the 
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Bankruptcy Code), for the proposition that a creditor may 
recover from non-debtor parties without reducing the value of 
its claim against a bankruptcy estate.  Because Nuveen stakes 
its argument on Ivanhoe, some background is required.  The 
debtor there executed a bond to a creditor; the bond was 
secured by a mortgage on real estate.  The creditor purchased 
the real estate at a foreclosure sale.  Though it then had the 
collateral in partial payment for its debt, the creditor 
nonetheless filed a claim for the full amount (principal and 
interest) of the debtor’s obligation under the bond.  The 
Supreme Court held that the claim was valid even though the 
creditor held property that partially satisfied the claim.  
However, the Court expressly clarified that the creditor “may 
not collect and retain dividends which with the sum realized 
from the foreclosure will more than make up that amount.”  
Id. at 246.  It subsequently explained this ruling as settling 
that “in bankruptcy proceedings . . . a creditor secured by the 
property of others need not deduct the value of that collateral 
or its proceeds in proving his debt.”  Reconstruction Fin. 
Corp. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 
529 (1946).             
Ivanhoe thus provides that a creditor may file a proof 
of claim for the total amount it is owed by a debtor even if it 
has recovered or may recover all or a portion of that amount 
from a non-debtor.  It does not hold that the actual amount the 
creditor collects from the estate evades reduction by recovery 
from third parties.  Rather, it states the exact opposite: a 
creditor cannot collect more, in total, than the amount it is 
owed.  Indeed, this distinction was present in case law prior to 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Ivanhoe.  See, e.g., Bd. of 
Comm’rs v. Hurley, 169 F. 92, 97 (8th Cir. 1909) (“[T]he 
holder of a claim, upon which several parties are personally 
liable, may prove his claim against the estates of those who 
become bankrupt and may at the same time pursue the others 
at law, and, notwithstanding partial payments after the 
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bankruptcy by other [parties] or their estates, he may recover 
dividends from each estate in bankruptcy upon the full 
amount of his claim at the time the petition in bankruptcy was 
filed therein until from all sources he has received full 
payment of his claim, but no longer.” (emphasis added)).  The 
distinction also has been associated with Ivanhoe in 
subsequent decisions.  See, e.g., Feder v. John Engelhorn & 
Sons, 202 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1953) (citing Ivanhoe for the 
holding that “the creditor . . . may prove his claim in full in 
the bankruptcy proceeding, although of course he may not 
retain dividends [from the estate] which, when combined with 
the amount realized on the security, exceed his claim”); In re 
Sacred Heart Hosp., 182 B.R. 413, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1995) (citing Ivanhoe and Reconstruction Finance and noting 
that “a creditor can seek to prove its entire claim in the 
bankrupt’s case notwithstanding the existence of third party 
collateral or guarantees of payment so long as the claimant 
does not seek to recover more than one full payment of its 
claim from whatever source”); see also Nat’l Energy & Gas 
Transmission, Inc. v. Liberty Elec. Power, LLC (In re Nat’l 
Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc.), 492 F.3d 297, 301 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (“In Ivanhoe, the Supreme Court held that a 
creditor need not deduct from his claim in bankruptcy an 
amount received from a non-debtor third party in partial 
satisfaction of an obligation.” (emphasis added)). 
 Ivanhoe is not codified explicitly in the Bankruptcy 
Code.  What we have are § 502,5
                                              
5 In pertinent part, § 502 provides that “[a] claim or interest, 
proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is 
deemed allowed, unless a party in interest, including a 
creditor of a general partner in a partnership that is a debtor in 
a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 502(a).  
 which deals with the 
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allowance of claims, and § 506(a),6
 Nuveen cannot rely on Ivanhoe and the Settlement 
Agreement to establish that the amount it will collect from 
 which concerns in part 
what constitutes a secured claim.  Of importance is that 
§§ 502 and 506(a) do not change the outcome that a creditor 
cannot collect more in total than it is owed.  For example, 
consistent with Ivanhoe and § 506(a), the Court in In re 
F.W.D.C., Inc., 158 B.R. 523, 528 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993), 
allowed a creditor to prove the total indebtedness against a 
guarantor-debtor without deducting the amount of collateral 
received from a third party.  But it emphasized that the 
creditor may not be able to collect the total indebtedness from 
the debtor, providing this instructive example:  “[I]f a creditor 
received collateral of a third party worth $8 million securing 
the third party’s indebtedness of $10 million and the 
guarantor of this $10 million indebtedness were in 
bankruptcy, such creditor would be allowed to prove a claim 
of $10 million but would not be allowed to realize more than 
$2 million.”  Id.   
                                              
6 In pertinent  part, § 506(a) reads:  
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien 
on property in which the estate has an interest, 
or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of 
this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the 
value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s 
interest in such property, or to the extent of the 
amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, 
and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the 
value of such creditor’s interest or the amount 
so subject to setoff is less than the amount of 
such allowed claim. 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).  
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Bayonne’s estate is fixed regardless of its recovery in this 
action.7
If, at the time of [the] suit . . ., [the] bankruptcy 
estate had already been administered by the 
trustee—i.e., if all property of the estate were 
collected, liquidated, and the proceeds 
distributed to creditors—then presumably [the 
plaintiff’s] potential damage recovery against 
  Yet its argument raises the issue of the timing of its 
recovery in this action and from Bayonne’s estate.  If a 
creditor’s recovery from a non-debtor definitely will not 
affect the amount of its payment from a bankruptcy estate, the 
third-party action is not “related to” the bankruptcy 
proceeding.  As the Fifth Circuit Court explained, this is true, 
for example, where a plan has been confirmed and the 
bankruptcy estate has been administered.   
                                              
7 Nuveen also argues that the Settlement Agreement must be 
read to fix the amount it will collect from Bayonne’s estate 
because the Agreement distinguishes between claims arising 
within the bankruptcy proceeding (“internal” claims) and 
claims arising from sources collateral to the bankruptcy 
proceeding, such as this action (“external” claims).  For 
internal claims, the Agreement defines the manner in which 
any recovery will offset a creditor’s claim.  Because the 
Agreement does not include similar express provisions 
regarding offsetting for external claims, Nuveen argues that to 
read it to allow offset of external claims inappropriately adds 
a term to the Agreement.  However, the Agreement merely 
fixes Nuveen’s claim against Bayonne’s estate.  Ivanhoe 
teaches that granting a creditor a claim against the estate does 
not mean that the creditor necessarily is entitled to collect 
from the estate that amount if that collection will allow it to 
receive more than it is owed.  Ivanhoe, 295 U.S. at 246.   
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the [non-debtor] defendants would have been 
limited to the amount of the outstanding 
judgment (that part of the judgment not paid 
through bankruptcy), and no effect on the estate 
would have been possible. 
Randall & Blake, Inc. v. Evans (In re Canion), 196 F.3d 579, 
586 n.27 (5th Cir. 1999).  
Similarly, if the amount of a creditor’s recovery from a non-
debtor depends on its recovery from a bankruptcy estate such 
that the asserted losses against the non-debtor only can be 
calculated when the creditor’s recovery from the bankruptcy 
estate is certain, there is no “related to” jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
In re J&J Towne Pharmacy, Inc., No. 09-17560, 2000 WL 
568355 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 5, 2000) (concluding that there 
was no “related to” jurisdiction over a malpractice action that 
could be adjudicated only after the bankruptcy estate had 
been administered because the amount of the losses sought in 
the action depended on the actual recoveries of secured and 
unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding).     
 In contrast, courts have held that “related to” 
jurisdiction does exist where a creditor’s recovery from a 
non-debtor conceivably could alter the amount of the 
creditor’s recovery from a bankruptcy estate.  For example, in 
advancing an argument similar to Nuveen’s in Canion, the 
creditor argued that were it successful in prosecuting its 
action against a non-debtor, its claims against the debtor’s 
estate would not be reduced or extinguished because the non-
debtor would stand in its shoes as a judgment creditor of the 
debtor based on legal subrogation (thus the debtor’s estate 
would owe the same amount regardless).  The Fifth Circuit 
rejected this argument, noting that there was no guarantee that 
the non-debtor would be allowed to step into the creditor’s 
shoes.   
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Assuming that [the creditor] should successfully 
collect from the defendants the judgment it 
holds against [the debtor], and assuming that . . 
. legal subrogation [would not be allowed], the 
total amounts due on claims against [the] 
bankruptcy estate would be decreased.  This 
decrease would inure to the benefit [of] all other 
unsecured creditors, each of whom would then 
share in the disbursement that would otherwise 
have been paid to [the creditor].       
Canion, 196 F.3d at 586.  See also Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Rapid 
Am. Corp (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619, 626–27 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (finding “related to” jurisdiction where a creditor’s 
claim against a non-debtor would reduce its claim in 
bankruptcy); Kaonohi Ohana, Ltd. v. Sutherland (In re 
Sutherland), 873 F.2d 1302, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding 
“related to” jurisdiction over a third-party action because the 
specific performance remedy sought in the third-party action 
would reduce the amount of damages in the related breach-of-
contract claim against a bankruptcy estate); Nat’l Union Fire 
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Titan Energy, Inc. (In re Titan 
Energy, Inc.), 837 F.2d 325, 329–30 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that a coverage dispute between the debtor’s insurance 
company and a creditor was “related to” the bankruptcy 
because a finding of coverage would reduce the claims 
against the estate); Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 
94 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Although we acknowledge the possibility 
that this suit may ultimately have no effect on the bankruptcy, 
we cannot conclude, on the facts before us, that it will have 
no conceivable effect.”) (emphasis in original). 
At the time Nuveen filed its complaint against Withum 
and Lindabury, the same loss it sought to recover in that 
action (primarily the unpaid principal and interest on the 
BAN) was included in the proof of claim filed by the master 
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trustee against Bayonne’s estate.  The loss also was included 
in the provisions of the Settlement Agreement whereby 
Nuveen’s portion of the proof of claim was resolved as an 
unsecured claim against Bayonne’s estate (which would be 
reduced dollar for dollar by other recoveries from the estate).   
Nonetheless, Nuveen now argues that it is not seeking 
to recover for the same grievance in this action as the harm 
encompassed by the proof of claim.  See Appellant’s Br. 35 
(“Nuveen’s bankruptcy claim and its claims against [Withum 
and Lindabury] are not ‘for the same grievance’ . . . .”).  This 
argument contradicts its statements throughout Bayonne’s 
bankruptcy proceeding acknowledging that this action and its 
claim against Bayonne’s estate relate to the same harm.  In 
seeking documents related to Bayonne’s pre-petition 
professionals, Nuveen stated that any recovery from claims 
brought against those professionals would decrease its claim 
against Bayonne’s estate.  See Application in Support of 
Motion for Nuveen High Yield Municipal Bond Fund to 
Compel the Production of Documents from the Debtor, In re 
Bayonne Medical Center, Case No. 07-15195 (Bankr. D. N.J. 
2007), ECF No. 1503 at 2, 8.  In this action, it asserts 
damages of $9.5 million, less any amounts recovered in 
Bayonne’s bankruptcy proceeding.  Moreover, before us 
Nuveen acknowledges that if it recovers in this action first, 
there will have to be an “accounting” in the bankruptcy to 
prevent double recovery by it.  Appellant’s Br. 36 n.10.      
The bottom line is that if Nuveen prevails in this 
action, it will not be permitted to recover more in total from 
Withum, Lindabury, and Bayonne’s estate than will make it 
whole as to its losses on the BAN.  Though Nuveen asserts 
that its claim against Bayonne’s estate should be assigned to 
Withum and Lindabury, there is no guarantee that if they 
moved to have the claim assigned to them, the assignment 
would be allowed.  Indeed, it is most likely that someone 
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would object to the assignment on the basis that it would be 
inequitable for a bad acting party to be assigned all or a 
portion of the claim, and that the money instead should go to 
unpaid creditors who acted in good faith.  Thus, at the time 
Nuveen filed its action, Bayonne’s liability to it conceivably 
could have been reduced, having a direct, indeed substantial, 
effect on the pool of assets available for distribution to 
Bayonne’s creditors.  The Pacor inquiry thus leads to the 
conclusion that Nuveen’s action is “related to” Bayonne’s 
bankruptcy proceeding. 8
                                              
8 Similarly focusing on Withum and Lindabury, Nuveen 
argues that if it is successful in this action, Bayonne’s estate 
will be affected if Withum and Lindabury file another, 
separate suit against Bayonne’s officers and directors based 
on their potential indemnification claims under Bayonne’s 
directors and officers liability insurance policy (the “D&O 
Policy”), which is property of Bayonne’s estate.  ACandS, 
Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252, 260 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“It has long been the rule in this Circuit that insurance 
policies are considered part of the property of a bankruptcy 
estate.”).  These indemnification claims include common law 
indemnification claims, which are inchoate—that is, they can 
be asserted only when there is a determination of Withum’s 
and Lindabury’s liability to Nuveen in this action.  See Bd. of 
Educ. of Florham Park v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 798 A.2d 605, 
610 (N.J. 2002); W.R. Grace, 591 F.3d at 171 (“[A]n inchoate 
claim of common law indemnity is not, in and of itself, 
enough to establish the bankruptcy court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.”).  Because Withum and Lindabury agreed to 
dismiss without prejudice their third-party complaints against 
certain of Bayonne’s officers, they will need to file another 
suit if they want to assert indemnification against them (and, 
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In a final attempt to defeat this conclusion, Nuveen 
argues that we should deviate from the hornbook rule that 
jurisdiction is assessed at the time of the filing of a complaint 
and assess jurisdiction now because significant intervening 
events support looking at post-filing events in reviewing 
“related to” jurisdiction.  Chief among these events is that the 
Plan has been confirmed and Bayonne’s bankruptcy 
proceeding is winding down.  With this argument, Nuveen in 
                                                                                                     
we presume, Bayonne’s directors).  Only after the filing of 
such a suit will Bayonne’s estate be implicated through the 
D&O Policy.  Compare Pacor, 743 F.2d at 995 (“The fact 
remains that any judgment received by the plaintiff . . . could 
not itself result in even a contingent claim against [the 
debtor], since [the defendant] would still be obliged to bring 
an entirely separate proceeding to receive indemnification.”), 
and W.R. Grace, 591 F.3d at 173 (“Here, we are presented 
with state court actions that have only the potential to give 
rise to a separate lawsuit seeking indemnification from the 
debtor.”), with Stoe v. Flaherty, 436 F.3d 209, 217–19 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (finding “related to” jurisdiction where there was 
an automatic right to indemnification).   
However, because Nuveen asserted a claim, as established by 
the Settlement Agreement, against Bayonne’s estate, the 
estate already is implicated.  Even though Withum and 
Lindabury may bring a third-party action against Bayonne’s 
officers depending on the outcome of this action, and the 
officers in turn may seek indemnification from Bayonne 
(thereby affecting Bayonne’s bankruptcy proceeding through 
another suit), the outcome of this action conceivably will 
resolve a portion of Bayonne’s possible liability.  This is 
sufficient to establish “related to” jurisdiction.   
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effect requests that we apply a post-confirmation gloss on the 
Pacor inquiry discussed above.   
Nuveen offers no case law to support its contention 
that we should adopt a new rule for determining “related to” 
jurisdiction in situations in which a plan is confirmed after the 
filing of the complaint or in which a bankruptcy estate is 
almost fully administered at the time the jurisdictional 
analysis is undertaken.  Indeed, had Nuveen initially filed the 
complaint in a New Jersey state court, as it now asserts it 
should have, Withum and Lindabury could have moved to 
transfer the action to the District Court based on “related to” 
jurisdiction immediately.  Under this scenario, when the 
Court assessed its jurisdiction, the Plan either would not have 
been confirmed or would have been confirmed only recently.  
There would be few (if any) intervening events to consider, 
and the Court would not question that “related to” jurisdiction 
should be assessed as of the date Nuveen filed the complaint.  
Only because “related to” jurisdiction was raised after 
Nuveen’s reversal of its position regarding diversity 
jurisdiction is Nuveen able to create an argument about 
intervening events.   
Supreme Court precedent is clear that the date of filing 
is the date when subject matter jurisdiction is assessed.  See, 
e.g., Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 582; Dole Food, 538 U.S. at 
478.  The unique procedural posture of this action should not 
affect that outcome.  Moreover, Bayonne’s bankruptcy 
proceeding, though nearing closure, remains open.  And even 
if it is closed, it can be reopened by a motion.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 350(b) (“A case may be reopened in the court in which such 
case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the 
debtor, or for other cause.”); Fed. R. Bank. P. 5010 (“A case 
may be reopened on motion of the debtor or other party in 
interest pursuant to § 350(b) of the Code.”).  As subject 
matter jurisdiction should be assessed at the time the 
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complaint was filed, Pacor’s analysis counsels that Nuveen’s 
action is “related to” Bayonne’s bankruptcy proceeding.  We 
thus affirm the District Court’s holding that it has jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).9
IV.  Choice of Law and the AOM Statute 
   
Nuveen raises two choice-of-law arguments regarding 
the application of the AOM Statute and certain protections 
abating its harsh consequences in federal court.  First, it cites 
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000), 
in which we held that the Statute was “substantive state law 
that must be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity” 
because Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9 did not 
“collide” with the Statute under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny.  Nuveen argues (as 
significantly developed by the amicus curiae brief filed by 
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.) that this holding has been 
overruled impliedly by the combination of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), with 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality opinion).  The assertion is 
that the pleading standard established by Twombly and Iqbal, 
when considered against the Statute under the Shady Grove 
analysis, makes the Statute procedurally in conflict with Rule 
8 such that it no longer can be applied by a federal court.   
On the flip side, Nuveen and amicus also argue that the 
two protections the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
                                              
9 Because the District Court held that it had jurisdiction over 
this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), it did not address 
whether it also had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We 
likewise need not address jurisdiction under § 1332.  
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established to dull the severe consequences of the failure to 
file a timely affidavit of merit—the addition to New Jersey’s 
Civil Case Information Sheet referencing the AOM Statute 
and the accelerated case management conference—are 
substantive requirements of the Statute that must be applied in 
federal court.10
A.  
   
 Before considering these two issues, we confront 
Withum’s and Lindabury’s contention that Nuveen failed to 
advance arguments about them before the District Court.  
Nuveen counters that it raised the distinction between federal 
and state law before the Court, specifically citing Burns v. 
Belafsky, 766 A.2d 1095 (N.J. 1999), and Ferreira v. 
Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779 (N.J. 2003), the 
cases in which the New Jersey Supreme Court established the 
two protections.  Though it did not cite Erie or Shady Grove, 
Nuveen asserts that the implications of its argument were 
Waiver 
                                              
10 Amicus further argues that the AOM Statute is an 
affirmative defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(c), and Withum’s and Lindabury’s failure to assert it as an 
affirmative defense in their responses to the complaint 
constitutes waiver.  An amicus cannot expand the scope of an 
appeal with issues not presented by the parties on appeal.  See 
N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 
383 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (rejecting an attempt by an amicus to 
raise an issue not addressed by the parties); Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Although an amicus brief can be helpful in elaborating 
issues properly presented by the parties, it is normally not a 
method for injecting new issues into an appeal, at least in 
cases where the parties are competently represented by 
counsel.”).  We thus do not address this argument. 
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clear and that its citation of Erie now is a natural extension 
and refinement of its argument below.  An argument is not 
waived if it “is inherent in the parties’ positions throughout 
[the] case.”  Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 2006).  
However, the argument must do more than “emanat[e] from 
the ethers of briefs filed in the district court.”  Brennan v. 
Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 418 (3d Cir. 2003).  The party must 
“present[] the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the 
district court.”  Id. (quoting Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 
983 F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir. 1993)).        
 Before the District Court, Nuveen argued (without 
reference to Erie) that the absence in federal court of (1) a 
New Jersey Civil Case Information Sheet referring to the 
AOM Statute and (2) an accelerated case management 
conference created “extraordinary circumstances” under New 
Jersey law that excused any failure to file a timely AOM, and 
thus required its complaint to be dismissed without prejudice.  
“Extraordinary circumstance” is one of four limited 
exceptions that the Supreme Court of New Jersey has 
recognized to the affidavit requirement under the AOM 
Statute.  See Ferreria, 836 A.2d at 783.  This is the argument 
that Nuveen advanced to the District Court with its citation of 
Burns and Ferreira, and we address it below.  See infra Part 
V.B.  Before doing so, however, we consider two choice-of-
law issues (see infra Part IV. B-C) that were not presented to 
the District Court and are distinct from Nuveen’s contentions 
regarding the exceptions to the Statute’s requirements.  
Merely citing Burns and Ferreira in its argument regarding 
extraordinary circumstances was not sufficient to alert the 
District Court that it also was raising these choice-of-law 
issues.   
 Nonetheless, we have not adopted a consistent rule 
regarding whether choice-of-law issues can be waived.  
Huber, 469 F.3d at 75 n.12.  In Parkway Baking Co., Inc. v. 
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Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 646 (3d Cir. 1958), and 
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 144 F.2d 626, 630 
(3d Cir. 1944), we held that choice-of-law questions are not 
waivable.  We noted in Certain Parcels that “[t]he 
appropriate law must be applied in each case and upon a 
failure to do so appellate courts should remand the cause to 
the trial court to afford it opportunity to apply the appropriate 
law, even if the question was not raised in the court below.”  
144 F.2d at 630.  In Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., 63 F.3d 
166, 180 n.10 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc), however, we deemed 
the choice-of-law question waived.  Neely, however, did not 
overrule Parkway Baking specifically or even address the 
case. 
 Moreover, we may review waived issues at our 
discretion.  See Wright v. Owens Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 105 
(3d Cir. 2012).  We have exercised our discretion in 
exceptional circumstances, such as when the “public interest 
. . . so warrants,” and particularly when issues are not fact 
dependent.  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 
834–35 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 
617, 620 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also Wright, 679 F.3d at 
105.   
Nuveen’s choice-of-law arguments involve issues 
purely of law, and given that they involve choice of law, the 
public interest weighs toward our consideration of them.  This 
is an appropriate circumstance for us to do so. 
B.  
Our last encounter with choice of law and the AOM 
Statute was in Chamberlain.  As noted, under an Erie analysis 
we concluded that the Statute is substantive state law.  Erie 
provides that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply 
Shady Grove and the AOM Statute as a Pleading 
Requirement 
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substantive state law and federal procedural law.11
[T]he importance of a state rule is indeed 
relevant, but only in the context of asking 
whether application of the rule would make so 
important a difference to the character or result 
of the litigation that failure to enforce it would 
unfairly discriminate against citizens of the 
forum State, or whether application of the rule 
would have so important an effect upon the 
fortunes of one or both of the litigants that 
  304 U.S. 
at 78.  Under Erie, a court assesses the substantive/procedural 
dichotomy with the objective that “the outcome of the 
litigation in the federal court [will] be substantially the same, 
so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it 
would be if tried in a State court.”  Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).  This “outcome determinative 
test” focuses on the “twin aims” of discouraging forum 
shopping and avoiding “the inequitable administration of the 
laws.”  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).  
Consideration of the “twin aims” should produce a decision 
favoring application of state law only if one of the aims is 
furthered:       
                                              
11 Where a claim that derives from state law is before a 
federal court based on “related to” jurisdiction, that court also 
must apply state law.  See, e.g., Statek Corp. v. Dev. 
Specialists, Inc. (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), 673 F.3d 180, 187 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) vests the district courts 
with original jurisdiction over civil proceedings ‘arising 
under,’ ‘arising in,’ or ‘related to’ cases under the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Such jurisdiction extends not only to questions of 
federal law, but also to many state law disputes.  Erie made 
clear that state law provides the rules of decision for the 
merits of state law claims in bankruptcy court.”). 
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failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a 
plaintiff to choose the federal court. 
Id. at 468 n.9 (emphasis added).   
 There are two caveats to the Erie analysis.  First, 
notwithstanding that its application should further the “twin 
aims,” if a “strong countervailing federal interest” dictates 
application of a federal rule, the federal rule controls.  
Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 159.  Second, the Erie rule cannot 
void a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “so long as the federal 
rule is authorized by the Rules Enabling Act and consistent 
with the Constitution.”12
 Proceeding under this analysis in Chamberlain, we 
found “no direct conflict” between Federal Rules 8 and 9 and 
the AOM Statute: 
  Id.  Prior to Shady Grove, to 
determine whether a state law voided a Rule, we considered 
whether the Rule “directly collided” with the state law.  Id. 
(citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470–74).  Absent a direct conflict, 
we followed the Erie dichotomy.  Id. 
The affidavit of merit statute has no effect on 
what is included in the pleadings of a case or 
the specificity thereof.  The required affidavit is 
not a pleading, is not filed until after the 
pleadings are closed, and does not contain a 
statement of the factual basis for the claim.  Its 
purpose is not to give notice of the plaintiff’s 
claim, but rather to assure that malpractice 
claims for which there is no expert support will 
be terminated at an early stage in the 
                                              
12 Rule 8 is within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act and 
consistent with the Constitution.  See Chamberlain, 210 F.3d 
at 160.   
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proceedings.  This state policy can be 
effectuated without compromising any of the 
policy choices reflected in Federal Rules 8 and 
9.     
Id. at 160.  We also addressed the Statute’s provision that 
failure to file an affidavit is “deemed a failure” to state a 
cause of action.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-29.  “We read the 
‘deeming’ language to be no more than the New Jersey 
legislature’s way of saying that the consequences of a failure 
to file shall be the same as those of a failure to state a claim.”  
Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160–61.  Failure to file the required 
affidavit thus does not render pleadings insufficient.  Id. at 
160.  
 Nuveen and amicus counsel question the continued 
validity of our conclusion that the AOM Statute does not 
“collide” with Rule 8 in light of Twombly, Iqbal, and Shady 
Grove.  Twombly and Iqbal established the pleading standard 
under Rule 8 that a party must demonstrate the plausibility, as 
opposed to conceivability, of its causes of action in the 
complaint.  See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 
230–35 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing Twombly and Iqbal).   
Shady Grove clarified the second caveat to the Erie 
analysis.  In determining that certification of a class action 
under Rule 23 alleging violations of New York law was 
proper even though New York law prohibited the action from 
proceeding as a class action, a plurality of the Court stated 
that the “collision” inquiry does not depend on “the 
substantive or procedural nature or purpose of the affected 
state law,” but rather “substantive or procedural nature of the 
Federal Rule.”  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444; see Knepper 
v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(discussing Shady Grove).   
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  However, as we held in Chamberlain, the affidavit of 
merit is not a pleading requirement.  It is not part of the 
complaint, nor does it need to be filed with the complaint.  
Rather, the affidavit must be filed within 60, or possibly 120 
days, after the defendant files its answer.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:53A-27.  The requirement exists to provide expert 
verification of the merits of the assertions in the complaint so 
that “malpractice claims for which there is no expert support 
will be terminated at an early stage in the proceedings.”  
Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160 (emphasis added).  Our 
holding in Chamberlain was premised on the temporal 
separation of the filing of the complaint and the affidavit.  
The AOM Statute “has no effect on what is included in the 
pleadings of a case or the specificity thereof.”  Id.  Rule 8 
does not collide with the Statute, as it is not even implicated 
by the Statute.   
 Twombly, Iqbal, and Shady Grove do not alter this 
conclusion.13
                                              
13 That the affidavit is not a pleading requirement counsels 
that a defendant seeking to “dismiss” an action based on the 
plaintiff’s failure to file a timely affidavit should file a motion 
for summary judgment under Rule 56, and not a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  
Though the AOM Statute directs courts to dismiss actions in 
which a timely affidavit has not been filed for “failure to state 
a claim,” because the affidavit is not a pleading requirement, 
this language merely provides that the consequences of not 
filing a timely affidavit are the same as failing to state a 
claim.  Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 610.  Indeed, because the 
affidavit is not part of the pleadings, dismissing an action 
based on the lack of an affidavit necessarily seems to involve 
matters outside the pleadings, which would require a court to 
consider a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as a 
  See also Liggon-Reading v. Estate of 
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Sugarmann, 659 F.3d 258, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding 
that Pennsylvania’s similar requirement that a certificate of 
merit be filed in malpractice cases is substantive state law that 
federal courts must apply under Erie).  The AOM Statute can 
be applied by a federal court without voiding any Federal 
Rules.14
C.  
  
 Having concluded that an action subject to the AOM 
Statute can be maintained in federal court, we proceed to the 
Erie analysis and consider whether the District Court should 
have afforded Nuveen the two protections the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has established to cut back the severe 
consequences of the failure to file a timely affidavit of 
merit—the addition to New Jersey’s Civil Case Information 
Sheet referencing the Statute and the accelerated case 
management conference (often called the “Ferreira 
conference,” see Ferreira, 836 A.2d at 785).  Nuveen and the 
amicus characterize these protections as part of a three-step 
process that includes the Statute, the Civil Case Information 
Sheet, and the accelerated conference.  According to them, 
though the protections are procedural, their objective is 
substantive and thus they are outcome determinative.  
New Jersey Civil Information Cover Sheet and Expedited 
Case Management Conference as Substantive State Law 
                                                                                                     
motion for summary judgment, as provided by Rule 12(d).  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 
12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented 
to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated 
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). 
14 There also is no strong countervailing federal interest that 
precludes application of the AOM Statute.  See Chamberlain, 
210 F.3d at 161. 
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 Turning to the information sheet first, the use of a 
particular form generally is a procedure of a state court, and 
the information provided to parties by a state court via its 
forms usually will not result in forum shopping.  Here, a 
plaintiff either will file in state court and be reminded of the 
affidavit requirement via the Civil Case Information Sheet, or 
will file in federal court and not be reminded of the 
requirement.  Moreover, plaintiffs (and their attorneys) are 
required to know the law.15
 The same is true for the Ferreira conference.  Though 
the New Jersey Supreme Court requires the conference, 
Ferreira, 836 A.2d at 785, it has held that its absence will not 
prevent an action from being dismissed based on the failure to 
file a timely affidavit.  See Paragon Contrs., Inc. v. Peachtree 
Condo. Ass’n, 997 A.2d 982, 987 (N.J. 2010) (“[O]ur creation 
of a tickler system to remind attorneys and their clients about 
critical filing dates plainly cannot trump the statute.  In other 
words, the absence of [the accelerated] conference cannot toll 
the legislatively prescribed time frames.”).  The timing of a 
conference that will not affect the outcome of a proceeding is 
  They should not need to be 
reminded of the affidavit requirement on an information 
sheet; thus the lack of a reminder does not result in 
inequitable administration of the AOM Statute.  In addition, a 
defendant has no incentive to remove a case from state to 
federal court based on the reminder of the affidavit 
requirement on the Civil Case Information Sheet because the 
burden is on the plaintiff to know the requirements for 
initiation of an action.  At bottom, the requirement that the 
Civil Case Information Sheet reference the Statute in New 
Jersey state actions is not a substantive requirement.    
                                              
15 The problem here is that both firms acting as Nuveen’s 
counsel were not from New Jersey.  This underscores the 
need to engage local counsel to avoid state-specific pitfalls.  
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unlikely to promote forum shopping and will not result in an 
inequitable administration of the Statute.  Moreover, a 
defendant has no incentive to remove a case from state to 
federal court solely to prevent the accelerated conference 
from being held because the plaintiff already will have been 
reminded of the affidavit requirement when it filed the Civil 
Case Information Sheet along with its complaint.           
  Neither protection furthers the “twin aims” of 
discouraging forum shopping and preventing the inequitable 
administration of state laws.  The protections are procedural.  
The District Court thus was not required to provide Nuveen 
with a reminder of the affidavit requirement on the cover 
sheet that Nuveen filed along with its complaint or to hold an 
accelerated conference.  The Court acted appropriately.  
V.  The AOM Statute and Dismissal of the Action 
 Having cleared jurisdictional and choice-of-law 
hurdles, we finally arrive at the core of Nuveen’s appeal—
whether, based on New Jersey state law, it can escape the 
harsh consequences of its counsel’s failure to file timely 
affidavits of merit as required by the AOM Statute.  As it did 
before the District Court, Nuveen argues that the Statute does 
not apply to all or a portion of the complaint and that, if it 
does apply, its counsel’s mistake can be excused based on its 
substantial compliance with the Statute or extraordinary 
circumstances.   
 To review, the AOM Statute requires a plaintiff in a 
malpractice action against a licensed professional seeking 
“damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property 
damage” to file an affidavit of merit from an appropriate 
licensed professional within 60 days of the defendant filing its 
answer.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27.  Upon a showing of 
good cause, the court may extend this deadline an additional 
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60 days.  Id.  Absent the plaintiff’s showing of one of four 
limited exceptions, if the affidavit of merit is not filed within 
60 (or 120) days, the failure to file requires dismissal of the 
action with prejudice.  Id. § 2A:53A-29.  The four limited 
exceptions are:  (i) a statutory exception regarding lack of 
information; (ii) a “common knowledge” exception; (iii) 
substantial compliance with the affidavit-of-merit 
requirement; or (iv) “extraordinary circumstances” that 
warrant equitable relief.  See id. § 2A:53A-28; Ferreira v. 
Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779, 782–83 (N.J. 
2003); Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495 (N.J. 2001); Cornblatt 
v. Barow, 708 A.2d 401, 411–12 (N.J. 1996).   
 We go out of turn, and consider first the arguments 
that, if the AOM Statute applies, Nuveen’s failure to file 
timely affidavits should be excused based on either its 
substantial compliance with the Statute or extraordinary 
circumstances.  Our answer in each instance is no.  We 
conclude with whether the Statute applies to all or but a 
portion of this action, as it is there that we reserve ruling 
pending the certification of two questions to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court. 
A.  
 The New Jersey Supreme Court has established a five-
part test to determine whether the equitable doctrine of 
substantial compliance excuses noncompliance with the 
AOM Statute:   
Substantial Compliance 
(1) the lack of prejudice to the defending party; 
(2) a series of steps taken to comply with the 
statute involved; (3) a general compliance with 
the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable 
notice of petitioner’s claim[;] and (5) a 
42 
 
reasonable explanation why there was not a 
strict compliance with the statute. 
Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 771 A.2d 1141, 1149 (N.J. 
2001) (quoting Bernstein v. Bd. of Trs. of Teachers’ Pension 
& Annuity Fund, 376 A.2d 563, 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1977)).  “Satisfying those elements guarantees that the 
underlying purpose of the statute is met and that no prejudice 
is visited on the opposing party.”  Id.  Though the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has noted that establishing the elements of 
substantial compliance “is a heavy burden,” id. at 1152, it 
also has stated that Cornblatt, in which it established that the 
doctrine applies to the Statute, is not a “narrow authorization 
of substantial compliance in the affidavit of merit setting.”  
Id. at 1150.  Overall, the analysis is fact sensitive, “involving 
the assessment of all of the idiosyncratic details of a case to 
determine whether ‘reasonable effectuation of the statute’s 
purpose’ has occurred.”  Id. at 1151 (quoting Cornblatt, 708 
A.2d at 401).  
1.  
The District Court held that Withum and Lindabury 
suffered prejudice by filing and defending their motions to 
dismiss.  Nuveen argues that its noncompliance did not cause 
them prejudice because the complaint was sufficiently 
detailed to provide them with reasonable notice of its claims.  
Thus, it contends, Withum and Lindabury were prepared for 
the suit after receiving the complaint.  In addition, Nuveen 
asserts that Withum and Lindabury did not incur undue 
additional defense costs in filing and litigating the motions to 
dismiss the complaint.  See Fink v. Thompson, 772 A.2d 386, 
394 (N.J. 2001) (holding that an affidavit that inadvertedly 
excluded the name of a defendant-professional involved in 
the malpractice action did not prejudice the defendant-
Lack of Prejudice to Withum and Lindabury 
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professional, and noting that “permitting plaintiff’s case to 
proceed would not result in undue additional defense costs”).   
We agree that the incurrence of additional costs to 
bring a motion to dismiss based on the failure to file the 
requisite affidavit is not sufficient to cause prejudice to a 
defendant.  If the costs of filing and defending the motion to 
dismiss were sufficiently prejudicial to preclude a showing of 
substantial compliance, few plaintiffs could prove substantial 
compliance.  Yet courts have found substantial compliance in 
a variety of circumstances.  See, e.g., Burns v. Belafsky, 766 
A.2d 1095, 1101 (N.J. 1999) (holding that failure to timely 
file affidavit was not prejudicial because it was “simply too 
early in the litigation for that claim to be credible”); Mayfield 
v. Cmty. Med. Assocs., P.A., 762 A.2d 237, 243 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2000) (stating that, where the affidavit was 
timely filed but served late, “there has been no showing of 
prejudice to defendants that would outweigh the strong 
preference for adjudication on the merits rather than final 
disposition for procedural reasons”). 
Nuveen provided Withum and Lindabury with a 
complaint that was detailed enough to place them on notice of 
the asserted claims without the affidavits.  The only apparent 
prejudice they suffered was the cost of filing and defending 
the motions to dismiss.  This is not sufficient prejudice to 
preclude a finding of substantial compliance.  Nonetheless, 
Nuveen still must demonstrate the other four factors.    
2.  “Series of Steps”
 Nuveen argues that, in holding that it did not take a 
“series of steps” necessary for substantial compliance, the 
District Court overlooked its actions to verify the merit of its 
complaint.  Nuveen highlights that it conducted an 18-month-
long investigation to support its allegations, which allowed it 
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to submit a detailed complaint.  During this extensive 
investigation, it consulted two experts who later submitted 
affidavits, one of whom provided it with a 16-page report 
before it filed the complaint.  It also notes that it provided 
Withum and Lindabury the affidavits one day after they filed 
their motions to dismiss. 
 Though Nuveen may have researched its complaint 
and scrambled to correct its mistake regarding the affidavits, 
its failure to take some action to comply with the affidavit 
requirement before the AOM Statute’s deadline expired 
appears fatal here.  A review of New Jersey Supreme Court 
cases discussing substantial compliance reveals that the 
“series of steps” element requires some effort by the plaintiff 
to provide the defendant with a statement of a professional 
discussing the merits of the action by the expiration of the 
120-day period.  See, e.g., Ferreira, 836 A.2d at 784 
(declining to find substantial compliance where “[p]laintiff’s 
counsel did not, within the statutory time frame, take steps to 
forward the affidavit to opposing counsel”); Palanque v. 
Lambert-Woolley, 774 A.2d 501, 506 (N.J. 2001) (“In both 
Galik and Fink, the plaintiffs took a series of steps that 
notified the defendants about the merits of the malpractice 
claims filed against them.  Here, no such action was taken.  
Plaintiff obtained an expert report but did not provide the 
report or an affidavit to defendant.  The action taken by 
plaintiff falls short of meeting the elements of substantial 
compliance.”); Fink, 772 A.2d at 386 (finding a “series of 
steps” where plaintiff served a timely affidavit that did not 
identify one of the defendant-professionals, but identified 
“unknown” professionals, and also provided a pre-suit expert 
report in which the unidentified defendant-professional was 
mentioned by name); Galik, 771 A.2d at 1151 (finding a 
“series of steps” where “[p]laintiff retained an expert before 
filing suit, forwarded the medical records to the expert, 
obtained both an initial and a supplementary expert report, 
45 
 
and sent both to defendants’ carriers who attempted to settle 
the case on defendants’ behalf”); Burns, 766 A.2d at 1101 
(finding substantial compliance where affidavit was served 
after 60 days, but before 120 days, after the answer, and only 
after defendants filed motions to dismiss); Cornblatt, 708 
A.2d at 411–12 (finding substantial compliance where 
plaintiff served a certification instead of an affidavit).       
 These decisions comport with the AOM Statute’s goal 
of weeding out frivolous lawsuits by providing defendants 
with independent opinions of the actions.  See Chamberlain, 
210 F.3d at 610.  As long as a defendant receives timely (that 
is, within the time allowed by the Statute) an opinion in the 
form of a document or combination of documents authored by 
a non-party discussing the merits of the action as to each 
defendant, the plaintiff will have fulfilled the “series of steps” 
element of substantial compliance.   
Nuveen communicated with two professionals before 
it filed the complaint.  One professional provided it with a 
report; the other merely discussed the potential action on the 
telephone.  Nuveen did not provide the report to Withum and 
Lindabury, and did not file it with the complaint.  It also did 
not obtain the affidavits until more than 120 days after 
Withum and Lindabury filed their answers.  The result is that 
it did not timely provide Withum and Lindabury with 
independent verification that the allegations in the complaint 
were sufficient to state causes of action for malpractice.  
Nuveen’s failure to engage in a “series of steps” undermines 
its argument that it substantially complied with the Statute.  
3.  Remaining Factors
 In arguing that it generally complied with the purposes 
of the AOM Statute, Nuveen again references the detailed 
complaint and its provision of the affidavits one day after 
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Withum and Lindabury filed their motions to dismiss.  
However, the purpose of the Statute is to identify frivolous 
malpractice actions by requiring independent verification of 
the validity of claims.  Regardless how detailed a complaint 
is, a pleading is self-serving and cannot be substituted for this 
independent verification.  In not attempting to provide 
independent verification of the merit of the complaint until 
more than 140 days after Withum and Lindabury filed their 
answers, Nuveen did not comply with the purposes of the 
Statute.      
 As to the fourth factor, we agree with the District 
Court that Nuveen’s detailed complaint provided Withum and 
Lindabury with reasonable notice of Nuveen’s claims.  
Reasonable notice refers to whether the defendant can 
understand the basis of the malpractice suit such that it can 
begin defending itself.  If a complaint is conclusive or does 
not specify particular professionals, an affidavit will be 
necessary to supplement the complaint for the defendant to be 
on reasonable notice of the asserted claims.  See, e.g., Kindig 
v. Gooberman, 149 F. Supp. 2d 159, 166 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(noting that the filing of complaint first notified the 
defendants).  But if a complaint is detailed, as here, it should 
provide the defendant with reasonable notice of the claims.   
 Finally, Nuveen provides one reason for its lack of 
strict compliance: inadvertence by its counsel.  However, 
New Jersey state courts have rejected attorney inadvertence 
alone as a sufficient ground for a party’s failure to comply 
with the AOM Statute.  See, e.g., Paragon Contrs., Inc. v. 
Peachtree Condo. Ass’n, 997 A.2d 982, 986 (N.J. 2010) 
(“[A]n attorney’s inadvertence in failing to timely file an 
affidavit will generally result in dismissal with prejudice.”).  
Nuveen’s counsel’s failure to exercise sufficient diligence in 
obtaining and serving affidavits is not a reasonable 
explanation for Nuveen’s noncompliance with the Statute.   
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*    *    *    *    * 
Though Nuveen filed a detailed complaint that put 
Withum and Lindabury on notice of its claims such that they 
did not incur undue additional expenses in defending the 
action, it failed to provide independent verification of the 
merits of the claims in its complaint.  Absent that independent 
verification, under the facts before us we (like the District 
Court) cannot hold that Nuveen substantially complied with 
the Statute.   
B.  
 Where a plaintiff cannot establish substantial 
compliance with the AOM Statute, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has held that dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint 
should be with prejudice in all but extraordinary 
circumstances.  See Ferreira, 836 A.2d at 783.  A finding of 
extraordinary circumstances results in a dismissal of the 
complaint without prejudice.  See Paragon, 997 A.2d at 986.  
Like substantial compliance, the extraordinary circumstances 
analysis is fact-specific.  See Hyman Zamft & Manard, L.L.C. 
v. Cornell, 707 A.2d 1068, 1071 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998).  Nuveen asserts that extraordinary circumstances exist 
here because the District Court did not afford it the two 
protections available in New Jersey state court (which were 
the subject of the Erie analysis above), and because Withum 
and Lindabury could have alerted it to its noncompliance with 
the Statute. 
Extraordinary Circumstances 
 We have identified no federal court decision finding 
extraordinary circumstances based even partially on New 
Jersey’s Civil Case Information Sheet.  Rather, federal courts 
focus on more typical “extraordinary circumstances,” stating 
that “[c]arelessness, lack of circumspection, or lack of 
diligence on the part of counsel are not extraordinary 
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circumstances which will excuse missing a filing deadline.”  
Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, LLC v. Shapiro, No. 06-6468, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30954, at *51 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 
2012) (quoting Hyman Zamft & Manard, 707 A.2d at 1071) 
(applying the AOM Statute).  The notice on the information 
sheet may provide plaintiffs with a useful reminder of the 
Statute, but plaintiffs and their counsel are responsible for 
knowing that an affidavit must accompany a malpractice 
claim under New Jersey law.   
And, ironically, Nuveen chose to file in federal, rather 
than state, court.  That choice by Nuveen alone, whereby it 
did not receive notice of the Statute on the federal form it was 
required to file along with its complaint, is not a basis for a 
finding of extraordinary circumstances. 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court established the 
accelerated “Ferreira conference” in 2003.  See Ferreira, 836 
A.2d at 785.  In an opinion issued the same day as Ferreira, it 
discussed the conference as if it were mandatory:  “Our 
decision in Ferreira requires that an accelerated case 
management conference be held within ninety days of the 
service of an answer in all malpractice actions.”  Knorr v. 
Smeal, 836 A.2d 794, 801 (N.J. 2003).  After Ferreira and 
Knorr, New Jersey intermediate state courts issued 
conflicting decisions regarding the effect of not holding a 
conference on whether an action should be dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to file a timely affidavit.  See Paragon, 
997 A.2d at 987.  To clarify, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
recently held that the absence of this conference will not 
preclude dismissal.  Id. at 987–88.    
In so clarifying, in Paragon it held that the confusion 
among New Jersey state courts “counsels lenience in this 
case.”  Id. at 987 (emphasis added).  The complaint in that 
case was captioned as a breach-of-contract claim, and the 
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plaintiff’s counsel filed a certification that a legal assistant in 
its office had been told by the state court that an affidavit 
would need to be filed prior to an unscheduled case 
management conference, and even if the affidavit was not 
filed before the conference, it could be filed later with the 
consent of the parties.  See Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. 
Peachtree Condominium Ass’n, 968 A.2d 752, 756–57 (N.J. 
Super Ct. App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 997 A.2d at 982.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that its finding of 
extraordinary circumstances arose from the confusion 
regarding the Ferreira conference.  Paragon, 997 A.2d at 
987. 
Here, Nuveen filed the complaint in December 2008, 
after Ferreira was decided, but before Paragon clarified it.  
Nuveen thus plausibly can assert that, at the time it filed the 
complaint, it was unclear whether the Ferreira conference 
was mandatory such that failure to hold it possibly could 
constitute an extraordinary circumstance.  However, 
“extraordinary circumstances” requires a fact-specific 
analysis.  The “confusion” in Paragon that led to the finding 
of extraordinary circumstances was created in large part by 
the state court and the initial captioning of the case as a 
breach-of-contract claim.  Moreover, in Paragon the 
plaintiff’s attorney inquired about the affidavit, demonstrating 
that the plaintiff tried to comply with the affidavit 
requirement.  In contrast, Nuveen (and its counsel) appear not 
to have attempted to determine if and when an affidavit was 
necessary.  Apparently Nuveen’s counsel simply was 
unaware of the requirement.  And, continuing with the theme 
already noted, “attorney inadvertence is not a circumstance 
entitling plaintiff to a remedy of dismissal of a complaint 
without prejudice.”  Ferreira, 836 A.2d at 784; see also 
Palanque, 774 A.2d at 505 (“[A]ttorney inadvertence will not 
support the extraordinary circumstances set forth in 
Cornblatt.”).  Lack of the accelerated conference is not a 
50 
 
basis for a finding of extraordinary circumstances in this 
instance.   
Finally, Withum and Lindabury had no duty to notify 
Nuveen of the affidavit requirement.  Ferreira establishes that 
the state court must inquire about the status of the affidavit if 
it has not been filed, not that the defendant must notify the 
plaintiff of the requirement.  See Ferreira, 836 A.2d at 785 
(“At the conference, the court will address all discovery 
issues, including whether an affidavit of merit has been 
served on defendant.  If an affidavit has been served, 
defendant will be required to advise the court whether he has 
any objections to the adequacy of the affidavit.”).  In addition, 
though defendants cannot sleep on their rights, Withum and 
Lindabury acted appropriately in waiting approximately three 
weeks after the 120-day period in which Nuveen had to file 
the affidavits expired to file their motions to dismiss.  See, 
e.g., Knorr, 836 A.2d at 801 (holding that equitable estoppel 
and laches barred the granting of motion to dismiss for failure 
to file a timely affidavit where the defendant waited 14 
months to file the motion, during which time the parties 
engaged in extensive discovery); Stoecker v. Echevarria, 975 
A.2d 975, 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (finding 
reliance on Knorr misplaced when the motion to dismiss for 
failure to file a timely affidavit was filed two and a half 
months after the affidavit was due).  Moreover, Withum and 
Lindabury should not be penalized for knowing the law— 
including that they should wait until after the expiration of the 
extended 120-day period (even if Nuveen had not requested 
an extension) to preclude an argument regarding substantial 
compliance—and using it to their advantage.   
 If Nuveen’s counsel had been diligent, it would not 
have needed a reminder on an information sheet, at a case 
management conference, or from Withum or Lindabury that it 
had an obligation to serve affidavits of merit.  Under New 
51 
 
Jersey law, attorney inadvertence alone cannot support a 
claim of extraordinary circumstances.  See, e.g., Ferreira, 836 
A.2d at 784; Palanque, 774 A.2d at 505.  We agree with the 
District Court that no extraordinary circumstances exist here.  
Thus, unless the action is not subject to the AOM Statute, we 
must uphold the District Court’s dismissal of that action with 
prejudice. 
C.  
 Nuveen argues that the AOM Statute does not apply to 
its entire action because it is not seeking recovery for 
“property damage” under the Statute, and alternatively that 
the Statute does not apply to the non-negligence and non-
malpractice claims it asserts against Withum.  We consider 
each argument in turn.   
The AOM Statute’s Application to Nuveen’s Action 
1.  
In primary support of the argument that it is not 
seeking recovery for “property damage” under the AOM 
Statute, Nuveen cites Couri v. Gardner, 801 A.2d 1134 (N.J. 
2002).  In that case, the plaintiff retained a licensed 
psychiatrist as a potential expert witness in connection with 
his divorce proceeding.  After the psychiatrist disclosed his 
preliminary findings without the plaintiff’s permission, the 
plaintiff filed a breach-of-contract action alleging that the 
psychiatrist was retained to prepare a report only for the 
plaintiff.  The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed whether 
the action was subject to the AOM Statute based on three 
elements:   
What Damages Are Covered by the AOM Statute? 
(1) whether the action is for “damages for 
personal injuries, wrongful death or property 
damage” (nature of injury); (2) whether the 
action is for “malpractice or negligence” (cause 
52 
 
of action); and (3) whether the “care, skill or 
knowledge exercised or exhibited in the 
treatment, practice or work that is the subject of 
the complaint [] fell outside acceptable 
professional or occupational standards or 
treatment practices” (standard of care).         
Id. at 1137.  It considered these elements in order.  
Addressing the “nature of injury” element first, it emphasized 
that the Statute “covers actions ‘for damages for personal 
injuries, wrongful death or property damage.’”  Id. at 1138 
(quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27).  It noted that though 
the plaintiff requested “compensatory and punitive damages” 
in his complaint, “at oral argument plaintiff narrowed his 
request for damages to the $12,000 that he paid to defendant 
for the report and any incidental costs incurred in the 
matrimonial action resulting from the necessity of filing 
motions based on defendant’s dissemination of the report.”  
Id.  Because these damages were not “damages for personal 
injuries, wrongful death or property damage,” the Court held 
that the plaintiff’s claim was not subject to the Statute.  
Though it continued on to address the “cause of action” 
element, the Court noted that it could “conclude [the] opinion 
at this juncture.”  Id.   
Based on Couri, query whether Nuveen’s action falls 
under the AOM Statute?  Couri counsels that the “nature of 
the injury” element of the Statute is to be considered first.  
Nuveen is requesting only money damages arising from 
alleged acts of Withum and Lindabury.  However, arguably 
the alleged acts have not caused “personal injuries, wrongful 
death or property damage,” particularly if “property damage” 
refers to damage to physical property.  We have found no 
decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court since Couri 
directly addressing the extent of the damages encompassed by 
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“damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property 
damage.”16
Indeed, the District Court based its holding that the 
action is subject to the AOM Statute on two New Jersey 
intermediate state court decisions—Cornblatt v. Barow, 696 
A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), and Nagim v. New 
Jersey Transit, 848 A.2d 61 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).  
Cornblatt was decided before Couri.  In Nagim, in holding 
that the asserted claim for defense costs pursuant to an 
indemnification contract was a claim for property damages 
within the meaning of the Statute, the Court distinguished 
Couri on the basis that the damages alleged in that action 
were for monies the plaintiff had paid to the expert under a 
contract, and not for any damages relating to malpractice.  It 
emphasized that the claim under the indemnification contract 
was limited to defense costs if the defendant was found to be 
without fault, and that the underlying action for which the 
defendant was seeking indemnification regarded professional 
engineering services for the construction of a parking lot.  It 
thereby determined that the damages related to claims of 
alleged professional malpractice causing “property damage,” 
   
                                              
16 Though the New Jersey Supreme Court recently stated that 
“[t]he [AOM] statute applies to all actions for damages based 
on professional malpractice,” Paragon, 997 A.2d at 985, in 
making this statement it referenced Charles A. Manganaro 
Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Carneys Point Twp. Sewerage 
Auth., 781 A.2d 1116 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), which 
was decided before Couri.  It also did not analyze whether the 
Statute applied to the action, and only addressed the effect of 
the failure to hold the accelerated case management 
conference.  See Paragon, 997 A.2d at 987.  Paragon thus 
does not tell us what injuries are encompassed by the term 
“property damage” as used in the Statute.    
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including damage to tangible property.  Nagim, 848 A.2d at 
69–71.  Nagim thus involved a claim for money damages 
arising from alleged malpractice causing damage to physical 
property.  And its emphasis on the underlying cause of action 
may conflate the “nature of the injury” and “cause of action” 
elements of the Statute.  In Couri, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court continued onto the analysis of whether the claims met 
the “cause of action” element only after it held that the 
damages requested did not meet the “nature of the injury” 
covered by the Statute, which it stated could have allowed it 
to end its inquiry.           
In this context, we are in doubt whether the New 
Jersey Supreme Court would hold that the AOM Statute 
applies to actions requesting damages for alleged acts of 
professional malpractice or negligence that do not cause 
personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage.  We are 
reluctant to speculate about how it would rule if confronted 
with a situation similar to the circumstances here.  
Accordingly, we shall certify to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court a question regarding the scope of the “nature of the 
injuries” element of the Statute, and postpone deciding if 
Nuveen’s action is subject to the Statute.   
2.  
 Nuveen asserts two intentional tort claims (common 
law fraud and aiding and abetting common law fraud) against 
Withum that are not the “malpractice or negligence” claims 
referenced by the text of the AOM Statute.  Couri again is the 
only decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court addressing 
what types of claims are subject to the Statute.  After holding 
that the “nature of the injury” asserted was not subject to the 
Statute, it addressed the “cause of action” element.   
What Claims Are Covered by the AOM Statute? 
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It is not the label placed on the action that is 
pivotal but the nature of the legal inquiry.  
Accordingly, when presented with a tort or 
contract claim asserted against a professional 
specified in the statute, rather than focusing on 
whether the claim is denominated as tort or 
contract, attorneys and courts should determine 
if the claim’s underlying factual allegations 
require proof of a deviation from the 
professional standard of care applicable to that 
specific profession.  If such proof is required, an 
affidavit of merit is required for that claim, 
unless some exception applies. . . .   
[That analysis] will ensure that tort claims 
brought against licensed professionals that 
allege ordinary negligence, but not malpractice, 
will not be subject to the statute.  Stated 
differently, by asking whether a claim’s 
underlying factual allegations require proof of 
a deviation from a professional standard of 
care, courts can assure that claims against 
licensed professionals acting in a professional 
capacity that [do not] require proof . . . of a 
deviation from professional standards are not 
encompassed by the statute.     
Couri, 801 A.2d at 1141 (emphases added).  Based on these 
guidelines, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
Statute did not apply because the asserted cause of action 
required proof that the expert breached the contract by 
distributing his preliminary report without the plaintiff’s 
consent, not that the expert deviated from standards of 
professional conduct in doing so.  Id. at 1142 (“Although 
defendant’s unauthorized dissemination of the report also 
might implicate a deviation from prevailing professional 
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standards of practice, proof of that deviation is not essential to 
the establishment of plaintiff's right to recover based on 
breach of contract.”).   
 Though Nuveen’s fraud claims implicate Withum’s 
purported failure to comply with accounting standards, 
Nuveen does not necessarily have to prove that Withum 
deviated from these standards to establish fraud.  See Gennari 
v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 367 (N.J. 1997) 
(“The five elements of common-law fraud are: (1) a material 
misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) 
knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an 
intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable 
reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting 
damages.”).  Rather, it has to prove that Withum intended to 
deceive it.  As in Couri, though Withum’s actions may 
suggest that it committed malpractice or acted negligently, 
proof of that malpractice or negligence is not necessary to the 
fraud claims.  Indeed, Nuveen asserts a separate claim for 
negligent misrepresentation against Withum.  The two fraud 
claims are distinct causes of action that may not be subject to 
the Statute.  See also Balthazar v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 816 
A.2d 1059, 1067–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) 
(“[C]auses of action alleging intentional torts that rely for 
their success upon proof of a deviation from the professional 
standard of care applicable to the profession are subject to the 
affidavit of merit requirement, regardless of their label.” 
(emphasis added)). 
Moreover, the AOM Statute requires submission of an 
affidavit of merit as a prerequisite for “any action for 
damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property 
damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or 
negligence by a licensed person in his profession or 
occupation . . . .”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27 (emphasis 
added).  Courts in states with similarly worded statutes 
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providing for the submission of some form of independent 
verification of professional malpractice or negligence actions 
have arrived at differing conclusions regarding whether their 
statutes apply to actions for fraud.  See, e.g., Williams v. 
Boyle, 72 P.3d 392, 399–400 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that 
claims for fraudulent concealment and fraud were subject to 
Colorado’s “certificate of review” statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 13-20-602); Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 519 S.E.2d 672, 678 
(Ga. 1999) (concluding that, in enacting Georgia’s similar 
statute, Ga. Code. Ann. § 9-11-9.1, “the legislative intent was 
to enact a statute which sought to reduce the number of 
frivolous professional malpractice actions by placing a 
procedural hurdle before those plaintiffs who sought damages 
for professional negligence.  Those claims grounded on a 
professional’s intentional acts which allegedly resulted in 
injury to one with whom the professional had a professional 
relationship are not required to be accompanied by an expert 
affidavit” (emphases in original)).  These divergent 
conclusions also cause us to be uncertain how the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would interpret the AOM Statute. 
 Again we are reluctant to decide how that Court would 
rule in these circumstances.  Thus we also will certify to it a 
question regarding whether intentional torts are subject to the 
Statute.                
VI.  Conclusion 
 Nuveen’s action is “related to” Bayonne’s bankruptcy 
proceeding because the outcome of this action conceivably 
may affect a portion of the Bayonne estate’s liabilities.  As 
such, we affirm the District Court’s holding that it had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).  Assuming that the 
action is subject to the AOM Statute, because Nuveen’s 
failure to fulfill the affidavit requirement resulted from 
inadvertence, we agree with the Court’s holding that 
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Nuveen’s noncompliance cannot be excused under New 
Jersey law.  However, we question whether the Statute 
applies to all or a portion of the claims alleged in the action.  
As the New Jersey Supreme Court can more definitively than 
we assess the “nature of the injury” and “cause of action” 
elements of the Statute, we reserve ruling on whether the 
action must be dismissed in whole or in part, and certify two 
questions addressing these elements to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court.17
                                              
17 We believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s answers 
to these two strictly legal issues, though framed by the factual 
circumstances here, will be amenable to many factual 
situations.  Their resolution will clarify what constitutes 
“property damage” under the AOM Statute and to what extent 
the Statute applies to causes of action against professionals 
other than for malpractice and negligence, yet related to 
alleged acts of malpractice and negligence.    
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
 
, dissenting. 
I agree with the Majority’s comprehensive treatment of 
many of the issues before our Court, and I therefore join in all 
parts of its opinion save one: the Majority’s decision in Part 
V.C to make no decision about whether the Affidavit of Merit 
(“AOM”) Statute applies here. The Majority has balked at 
exercising our duty to interpret state law when sitting in 
diversity, and has chosen instead to certify two questions to 
the New Jersey Supreme Court: (1) whether the money 
damages requested by Nuveen in this case are considered 
“property damages” under the AOM Statute; and (2) whether 
an action alleging an intentional tort, such as common law 
fraud or aiding and abetting common law fraud, is subject to 
the same statute. 
 
Four federal judges have ruled on these issues; we 
seem to be divided on the result, two and two: District Judge 
Garret E. Brown Jr. and myself on one side, and my 
colleagues in the Majority on the other. It is thus difficult to 
say that those who now seek certification reflect the view of 
the Third Circuit that the New Jersey Supreme Court has not 
been adequately clear on the points in question.  
 
We are charged with the responsibility of deciding 
state law issues contained in federal diversity cases, and we 
may not shirk that duty merely because those issues may be 
difficult, unwieldy, or ponderous. As Judge Jones said on our 
Court’s behalf three-quarters of a century ago, when 
considering “the responsibility which Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), cast upon federal courts, of 
deciding questions of state law in diversity cases,” we must 
“‘not hesitate[] to decide questions of state law when 
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necessary for the disposition of a case brought to [us] for 
decision,” even if “the highest court of the state ha[s] not 
answered them, the answers [are] difficult, and the character 
of the answers which the highest state courts might ultimately 
give remain[] uncertain.’”  Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. 
Lewis, 141 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1944) (quoting Meredith v. 
City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943)). This is 
especially so “where, as in the present instance, the pertinent 
question of local law is directly involved and is duly raised by 
the pleadings and the material facts as stipulated by the 
parties.” 
 
Id. 
In my view, certification should be limited to basic 
legal issues of great import, amenable to application in a large 
panoply of factual situations, rather than the fact-bound issues 
presented in this limited certification. See e.g., Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997) (“Novel, 
unsettled questions of state law, however, not ‘unique 
circumstances,’ are necessary before federal courts may avail 
themselves of state certification procedures.”) (quoting 
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English
 
, 69 F.3d 920, 931 
(9th Cir. 1995)). Because I conclude that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s view has been expressed sufficiently to 
facilitate our review, I respectfully dissent from the 
certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court.  
I. 
 
 The first issue the Majority certifies is whether the 
money damages sought by Nuveen are considered “property 
damages” under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27, which provides 
that an affidavit of merit is required in actions seeking 
“damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property 
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damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or 
negligence by a licensed person in his profession or 
occupation.” Certification of this issue is unnecessary because 
the New Jersey Supreme Court has already answered the 
question: “The [AOM] statute applies to all actions for 
damages based on professional malpractice.” Paragon 
Contrs., Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass’n
 
, 997 A.2d 982, 985 
(N.J. 2010) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 A federal court sitting in diversity is “bound to follow 
state law as announced by the highest state court.” Sheridan 
v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 253 (3rd Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has clearly expressed its view on 
the AOM Statute’s applicability. Even if “the state’s highest 
court has not addressed the precise question presented, [we] 
must [still] predict how the state’s highest court would 
resolve the issue,” rather than merely punt the issue to the 
state court because of a perceived lack of clarity. Orson, Inc. 
v. Miramax Film Corp.
 
, 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 
1996) (emphasis added).  
The Majority relies on the teachings of Couri v. 
Gardner, 801 A.2d 1134 (N.J. 2002), to explain their doubt as 
to whether the money damages sought here fall within the 
ambit of the AOM Statute. But Couri is factually 
distinguishable from this matter and does not sow seeds of 
doubt regarding the New Jersey Supreme Court’s view of the 
issue currently before us. Unlike the plaintiff in Couri, who 
brought a breach-of-contract action seeking a finite sum of 
money he had already paid to the defendant, see 801 A.2d at 
1141, here, Nuveen seeks the money it paid as part of a 
transaction with a non-party. Nuveen has not paid any money 
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to Appellees and has not brought a breach-of-contract claim 
against either Appellee. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
view is unambiguous: because Nuveen’s “action for damages 
[is] based on professional malpractice,” the AOM statute 
applies. Paragon, 997 A.2d at 985.1
 
 
II. 
 
The second issue the Majority certifies is whether an 
action alleging an intentional tort, such as common law fraud 
or aiding and abetting common law fraud, is subject to N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27. But, once again, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has already answered this question: “[W]hen 
                                              
1 Nuveen’s interpretation of “property damages,” moreover, 
would render the AOM Statute’s provisions meaningless with 
respect to attorneys and accountants—the professions of 
Appellees here. For certain professionals, it is rare that 
malpractice would result in personal injuries or death. See 
Cornblatt v. Barow, 696 A.2d 65, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1997), rev’d on other grounds 708 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1998). 
If Nuveen were correct that “property damages” do not 
include money damages, the AOM Statute would hardly ever 
apply to attorneys or accountants and would essentially be 
confined to actions for medical malpractice. But both 
accountants and attorneys are professionals defined by the 
Statute as a “licensed person.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-26. 
New Jersey courts have held that it was not the legislature’s 
intent to exclude these professions. See e.g., Cornblatt, 696 
A.2d at 68 (“[A] claim against an attorney for alleged 
malpractice is a claim for property damage within the 
legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute.”). 
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asserting a claim against a professional covered by the statute, 
whether in contract or in tort, a claimant should determine if 
the underlying factual allegations of the claim require proof 
of a deviation from the professional standard of care for that 
specific profession.” Couri, 801 A.2d at 1141. “If such proof 
is required, an affidavit of merit shall be mandatory for that 
claim, unless either the statutory, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-
28, or common knowledge exceptions apply.” Id.
 
  
The instructions are clear; we must merely apply the 
rule to the facts before us—a task that New Jersey state courts 
have had no problem accomplishing. See e.g., Risko v. 
Ciocca, 812 A.2d 1138, 1142-1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003) (applying the teachings of Couri
 
 and concluding that 
“no exception is applicable in this case, which essentially 
deals with a claimed deviation in the standard of care, an 
affidavit of merit was required”). 
Here, Nuveen contends that intentional 
misrepresentations were made as a result of Withum’s failure 
to abide by the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(“GAAP”) and the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(“GAAS”). Thus, Nuveen’s fraud claims plainly require proof 
that Withum deviated from professional standards of care. 
“[C]auses of action alleging intentional torts that rely for their 
success upon proof of deviation from the professional 
standard of care applicable to the profession are subject to the 
AOM requirement, regardless of their label.” Balthazar v. 
Atlantic City Med. Ctr., 816 A.2d 1059, 1067 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2003) (citing Couri
 
, 801 A.2d 1134). Because the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has sufficiently expressed its 
view on the issue, certification is not warranted. 
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III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully disagree with 
the Majority and would not certify any questions to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, but instead, would decide the state law 
issues properly before us. 
